

**PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS**

**2025**

**POSSIBLE POST-ELECTORAL  
SCENARIOS**

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Since its establishment in 2000, ADEPT has been at the forefront of initiatives aimed at enhancing good governance, ensuring electoral integrity, and fostering civic participation through research, advocacy, and public outreach. Since 2018, ADEPT has served as the Secretariat of the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (CALC), a platform uniting civil society organizations to uphold transparency, inclusiveness, and integrity in electoral processes in the Republic of Moldova.



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# I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This analytical note presents the main possible scenarios of post-electoral developments in the Republic of Moldova, aiming to provide a structured and objective assessment of the risks and opportunities associated with each configuration of governance. The document seeks to support policymakers, experts, and the media in understanding the internal and external implications of the electoral outcomes, to facilitate informed debate, and to contribute to anticipating challenges that may affect the country's political stability, security, and European trajectory.

The parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025 take place in a volatile security environment and under the pressure of hybrid warfare tools (illicit financing, voter corruption, disinformation, cyberattacks, discouragement of the diaspora). This context raises the stakes of the elections: confirmation of the European course or entry into a strategic grey zone.

Modeling based on electoral precedents, aggregated polls, and the weight of the diaspora vote indicates the entry of four parties into Parliament: PAS, BEP, BEA, PN. In the aggregated "in-country + diaspora" scenario, the indicative distribution of seats is PAS – 47, BEP – 35, BEA – 10, PN – 9, with sensitivities to mobilization ( $\pm 2\%$ ) and external interference.

Based on this arithmetic and on a compatibility matrix built around six structuring themes (foreign policy orientation, national symbols, the Transnistrian conflict, energy independence, neutrality, justice reform), a limited set of post-electoral scenarios emerges:

- **Single-party PAS government – *plausible but not guaranteed***: continuity on European integration, non-military security, and justice; vulnerabilities to external pressures and execution capacity.
- **Single-party BEP government – *less likely***: risk of stagnation on the European path, pro-Gazprom energy repositioning, temptation of "camouflaged federalization," and internal tensions.
- **Binary coalitions (*most plausible*)**:
  - ⊙ **PAS + BEA (*medium probability*)**: maintaining the pro-EU direction at a slower pace, difficult negotiations on justice/energy/Transnistria, and possible interpersonal friction.
  - ⊙ **PAS + PN (*moderate probability*)**: pro-EU continuity with deceleration; divergences on neutrality and budgetary-social policies.
  - ⊙ **BEP + BEA (*moderate probability, fragile stability*)**: risk of a "Georgian model" (pause on EU, eastern reorientation), with possible economic and reputational costs.
  - ⊙ **BEP + PN (*unlikely*)**: would require additional support; risks similar to a pro-Eastern orientation.

Tripartite coalitions remain *theoretically possible* but fragile. A deadlock scenario (inability to form a majority) is unlikely but would quickly push toward early elections with PAS vs. PSRM polarization. At the same time, the destabilizing post-electoral scenario – fueled by calls for protests "regardless of the result" and by the "Șor network" infrastructure – cannot be ignored and requires adequate institutional preparedness.

**Understood!** I can revise your entire English translation using precise political science and electoral terminology. Here's a professional version of your **Methodology** section with one phrase per line, keeping the structure and replacing "undecided voters" and "post-vote contestations" with standard political terms:

## II. METHODOLOGY

The analytical approach followed a four-step process:

- 1. Empirical basis and electoral precedent.** We used the history of the 10 parliamentary campaigns (1994–2021) to identify patterns (average number of competitors, number of parties surpassing the threshold, absence of independent MPs in the proportional system) and to establish a behavioral “inertia” of the electorate, relevant for assessing thresholds in 2025.
- 2. Weight of votes from abroad.** We calibrated overseas voter participation at approximately 240–260 thousand voters (~15% of the total), recognizing the traditionally pro-EU distribution and a recent decline of PAS support compared to 2021; this estimate is deliberately conservative, considering the operational sabotage risks signaled by the CSS.
- 3. Sociological data and treatment of undecided voters.** We aggregated campaign survey results, accounting for the increase in refusals and undecided voters; where a series reported an atypical undecided voter rate (~40%), we preferred not to include it in the average, taking into account influence structures (“Şor network”) that could distort the final distribution of preferences.
- 4. Institutional modeling.** We used the d’Hondt method to simulate the distribution of mandates in two stages: (i) votes cast within the country; (ii) aggregated “domestic + diaspora” scenario. In the first scenario, the outcome leads to 42/38/11/10 mandates (PAS/BEP/BEA/PN); in the aggregated scenario, 47/35/10/9, with explicit uncertainties regarding relative mobilization ( $\pm 2\%$ ) and potential effects of external interference.

**Interpretation tool.** To assess coalition feasibility, we constructed a compatibility matrix across six structuring topics: (1) foreign integration vector; (2) national symbols; (3) Transnistrian settlement; (4) energy independence; (5) neutrality; (6) judicial reform. The matrix indicates proximities and red lines between PAS, BEP, BEA, and PN, allowing us to narrow down the scenarios to a limited set of probable configurations (less likely single-party governments vs. more likely binary coalitions; tripartite coalitions – fragile).

**Limitations and analytical caution.** The results are sensitive to: (i) dynamics of domestic and diaspora mobilization; (ii) final distribution of undecided voters under disinformation conditions; (iii) potential security events or post-election disputes, including destabilization scenarios. Consequently, numerical interpretation should be viewed as ranges and orders of magnitude rather than immutable point estimates.

## III. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

*Possible outcomes analyze the probable political configuration of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025, based on the experience of previous campaigns, public opinion survey data, and the decisive impact of diaspora voting. The findings suggest that only four political formations have a realistic chance of entering the legislature, with the distribution of seats sensitive to the level of mobilization and external influence. This arithmetic generates a range of post-election scenarios, from unlikely single-party governments to more plausible binary coalitions and even unstable tripartite coalition hypotheses. At the same time, the risk of a post-election destabilization scenario remains, marked by disputes, protests, and political crises with the potential to evoke the events of April 2009.*

### 3.1. Experience of Previous Electoral Campaigns

The analysis of the ten parliamentary campaigns conducted between 1994–2021 reveals several important constants:

- ⊙ the average number of competitors was approximately 25;
- ⊙ between 3 and 5 political formations consistently exceeded the electoral threshold;
- ⊙ no independent candidate has ever obtained parliamentary representation under the proportional system.

These regularities confirm the existence of an inertia factor in the electoral behavior of citizens.

Applied to the elections of 28 September 2025, this trend suggests that, among the 23 registered competitors, it is highly likely that only four formations will surpass the threshold, which corresponds to the historical average. The chances of an independent candidate exceeding the 2% threshold are low, although not entirely impossible.

In the post-election context, this configuration with four parliamentary parties theoretically allows for 15 possible majority formulas. For reasons of political probability and programmatic compatibility, only a few of these emerge as plausible.

At the same time, the experience of the **5 April 2009** election highlights an additional post-election destabilization scenario, fueled by possible external interference and disputes over the results—an aspect that should be taken into account in the risk analysis.

### 3.2. Sociological Research

Pre-election and election period opinion polls constitute an essential source for estimating the chances of competitors to be represented in Parliament. Over the past two decades, 4–5 sociological companies have consistently measured voter preferences, and in the 2019 and 2021 campaigns, their results broadly reflected the balance of power, with differences explainable by the uncovered share of the diaspora vote.

**Table 1. Difference between the average of poll results and parliamentary election outcomes in 2019 and 2021**

<b>Parliamentary Elections 24.02.2019</b>	<b>PSRM</b>	<b>ACUM</b>	<b>PDM</b>	<b>PȘ</b>	<b>PCRM</b>	<b>PN</b>
Polls / Average during the election period	41,5%	22%	20,4%	6.1%	4,2%	2,3%
Election results	31,2%	26,8%	23,65%	8,3%	3,8%	3%

<b>Parliamentary Elections 11.07.2021</b>	<b>PAS</b>	<b>BESC</b>	<b>PȘ</b>	<b>BERU</b>	<b>PDA</b>	<b>AUR</b>
Polls / Average during the election period	42,6%	33,6%	6,8%	5,3%	3.3%	1,7%
Election results	52,8%	27,2%	5,7%	4,1%	2,3%	0,5%

Comparing the data, however, reveals significant deviations. In 2019 and 2021, the parties with the highest electoral support achieved election day results that considerably exceeded the average estimates from the polls. The main explanation is the exclusion of voters from abroad in the samples, even though their share reached between 15% and 20% of the electorate.

In the 2025 parliamentary campaign, polls identified four main competitors with realistic chances of surpassing the electoral threshold:

- ⊙ **Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS)** – Action and Solidarity Party (PAS)
- ⊙ **Blocului electoral „Blocul Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Comuniștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei” (BEP)** – Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova” (BEP)
- ⊙ **Blocului electoral „Alternativa” (BEA)** – Electoral Bloc “Alternative” (BEA)
- ⊙ **Partidul Nostru (PN)** – Our Party (PN).

**Table 2. Poll results during the election period for the 28 September 2025 elections**

<b>Parliamentary elections 28.09.2025</b>	<b>Undecided voters</b>	<b>PAS</b>	<b>BEP</b>	<b>BEA</b>	<b>PN</b>
iDATA (±2.9%) 20.08-03.09	30%	34,7%	36,0%	7,9%	8,4%
iDATA (±2.9%) 07.08-16.08	28.3%	36.1%	27,5%	11,3%	9,2%
Average (excluding CBS-Research/WatchDog data)	29,2%	35,4%	31,8%	9,6%	8.8%

The aggregated average of valid polls places these formations at comparable levels: PAS – 35.4%, BEP – 31.8%, BEA – 9.6%, and PN – 8.8%. However, compared to previous campaigns, the results appear less robust. Sociologists explain the phenomenon by:

- ⊙ the increase in refusals to participate in polls, ranging between 10% and 20%;
- ⊙ the significant expansion of undecided voters, reaching 30–40%, contrary to the natural tendency to decrease as the election approaches.

An additional cause is related to the impact of the “Șor network,” estimated at 10–15% of the electorate, which remained uncertain after the exclusion from the competition of the “Victory Bloc” (**Blocului Victorie**) and the successor formations of the Șor Party. Under these conditions, some surveys—such as the one conducted by CBS-Research/WatchDog, which recorded nearly 40% undecided voters—were omitted from the aggregation, as they would have distorted the forecast.

Simulations using the d’Hondt method applied to the domestic vote indicate the following hypothetical distribution of seats: PAS – 42, BEP – 38, BEA – 11, PN – 10. This projection is, however, partial, as it does not take into account the vote from abroad, which has the potential to significantly modify the final configuration.

### 3.3. Voting from abroad

Following the amendment of the Electoral Code in 2010, the number of polling stations abroad has steadily increased, boosting diaspora participation. A prudent estimate for the 28 September 2025 election indicates 240–260 thousand voters (≈15% of the total), also taking into account the risks signaled by the Supreme Security Council regarding attempts to sabotage the electoral process abroad.

**Table 3. Dynamics of voting participation of Moldovan citizens abroad**

<b>Electoral Year</b>	<b>No. of Participating Voters (thousands)</b>	<b>Share of Total Electorate</b>
2010 - First polling stations outside diplomatic missions	~65	~5%
2014 (parliamentary)	~73	~6%
2019 (parliamentary)	~150	~11%
2021 (snap parliamentary)	~212	~14%
2024 (presidential, round I)	~240	~15%
2024 (presidential, round II)	~330	~20%
<b>2025 (parliamentary, estimate)</b>	<b>240–260</b>	<b>~15%</b>

The concentration of approximately 90% of the diaspora in EU countries, the United Kingdom, and North America explains its pro-European orientation. In 2021, within the diaspora, PAS received 86% of the votes, while PSRM obtained 2.5%; in the 2024 presidential elections, PAS garnered 71% in the first round and 83% in the second round, whereas PSRM recorded 8% in the first round and 17% in the second round, indicating a gradual decline in PAS’s share compared to 2021.

**Table 4. Diaspora vote for the main political parties**

Election	PAS (%)	PSRM (%)	Notes
2021 (parliamentary)	86	2,5	Massive vote for PAS
2024 (presidential, round I)	71	8	Slight erosion of PAS support
2024 (presidential, round II)	83	17	PSRM gains, but PAS remains dominant
2025 (estimate)	≈ 65–70	>10	Declining trend for PAS

Building on this trend and the effect of government fatigue, a working hypothesis is that, in the diaspora, PAS could decline to approximately two-thirds of its 2021 share. In the aggregated “country + diaspora” scenario, the estimated vote distribution would be: PAS – 41%, BEP – 29%, BEA – 9%, PN – 8%; applying the d’Hondt method results in PAS – 47 seats, BEP – 35, BEA – 10, PN – 9.

These projections are indicative and remain sensitive to: (i) mobilization within the country; (ii) diaspora participation, where an additional ~2% could push PAS to the majority threshold; (iii) external influence networks, including structures associated with the former “Şor Party.”

### 3.4. Possible Post-Election Formulas

Based on the estimated results and the configuration with four parliamentary parties, 15 possible majority formulas can be identified. From a probabilistic and programmatic compatibility perspective, only a few emerge as realistic.

**Table 5. Types of Possible Majorities**

Scenario Type	Variants	General Assessment
<b>Single-party governments</b>	1. PAS; 2. BEP;	Possible only under exceptional results
<b>Binary coalitions</b>	3. PAS + BEA; 4. PAS + PN; 5. BEP + BEA; 6. BEP + PN	Most probable, based on arithmetic and selective proximities
<b>Tripartite coalitions</b>	7. PAS + BEA + PN; 8. BEP + BEA + PN; other theoretical combinations	Feasible only on paper, fragile due to ideological divergences
<b>Destabilizing scenario</b>	Prolonged crises, protests, snap elections	Risk of contestation and external interference evokes the “April 7, 2009 syndrome”

Single-party governments would undoubtedly represent the most stable political configuration, yet their likelihood is low and depends on an exceptional electoral outcome.

In contrast, binary coalitions emerge as the most plausible scenarios, as they combine a functional arithmetic majority with a minimum of political compatibility between partners.

Tripartite coalitions may only appear as compromise solutions to avoid institutional deadlock, but past experience shows that such arrangements are fragile and vulnerable to internal tensions.

Simultaneously, the destabilizing scenario cannot be ignored, fueled by calls for immediate protests and potential external interference, which could lead to prolonged political crises and even early elections, reminiscent of the “April 7, 2009 syndrome.”

## IV. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND ITS EFFECTS

*The electoral process in the Republic of Moldova has been consistently marked by foreign interference, particularly from the Russian Federation. These manifested through political pressure, economic sanctions, propaganda campaigns, direct financial support to Moscow-aligned political parties, and sophisticated mechanisms of voter bribery and manipulation. While in 2005 and 2014 interference occurred through pressure measures and direct support to certain parties, after the aggression against Ukraine, the scale and intensity of interference increased exponentially, reaching the level of a well-organized and generously funded network. The examples presented below illustrate not only the continuity but also the adaptability of these mechanisms, which decisively influenced the evolution of domestic political life and the party architecture in the Republic of Moldova.*

### 4.1. The first foreign interference with major impact on the governing party

The first explicit foreign interference in the electoral process of the Republic of Moldova occurred during the parliamentary election campaign of March 6, 2005. On February 18, 2005, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted a [Declaration](#) “On the Countermeasures of the Russian Federation against the Republic of Moldova in connection with the policy of Moldovan authorities escalating the situation around Transnistria.” The document recommended the imposition of economic and trade sanctions and the review of gas supply contracts.

This reaction followed the [statement by Foreign Minister](#) Andrei Stratan at the OSCE meeting in Sofia (December 2004), in which he characterized the Russian military presence in Transnistria as illegal and an occupation. Stratan’s statement was, in turn, a response to Moscow’s refusal to support President Vladimir Voronin’s initiative regarding the “[Stability and Security Pact for Moldova](#)” (June 1, 2004), which proposed recognizing Moldova’s neutrality as a guarantee for resolving the Transnistrian conflict.

Another trigger for the Russian response was the Tarlev Government’s decision on February 11, 2005, to expel five Russian citizens for electoral interference, including the [illegal financing](#) of opponents of the Communist Party (PCRM). Shortly thereafter, hostilities escalated: on February 23, 2005, Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev [publicly announced](#) the discovery of an arsenal of weapons and flammable materials in central Chişinău, intended to destabilize the situation via the Tiraspol regime, with estimated funding of 40 million dollars.

The threats outlined in the Duma Declaration were implemented in 2006: Russia imposed trade sanctions and altered the gas supply regime via Gazprom. In response, the Tarlev Government hired experts from the American Bar Association (ABA) to demonstrate, in an [international report](#), Transnistria’s status as an occupied region. Through a 2006 decree, the Government approved an Action Plan aimed at informing the international community, requesting hearings in the parliaments of EU and US states, and distributing the ABA report as an official document of the UN General Assembly.

The effects of this interference were felt in the medium term through the erosion and fragmentation of the PCRM:

- ⦿ In March 2008, Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev resigned and founded the organization “Friends of Russia in Moldova”;
- ⦿ In November 2011, Zinaida Greceanii and Igor Dodon left the PCRM and took over the leadership of the Socialist Party (PSRM), with the declared objective of Eurasian integration;

- ⦿ In December 2024, Irina Vlah left the PCRM faction to assume, with Russian support, the leadership of the Gagauz autonomy.

Thus, the 2005 interference produced long-lasting structural consequences: it accelerated the disintegration of the PCRM and laid the foundations for the emergence of a new generation of Moscow-oriented political leaders, who later became the main political figures of the Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP).

## 4.2. Russia’s Involvement in the 2014 Parliamentary and 2015 Regional Elections

The interference of the Russian Federation in the 2014 parliamentary elections differed from that in 2005. While earlier pressures targeted the ruling party, this time Moscow’s support was openly directed in favor of PSRM, to the detriment of PCRM. The mechanism was simple and effective: more than half of PCRM’s electorate was transferred to PSRM through a symbolic and well-targeted campaign, illustrated by an electoral banner with strong impact on Russian-speaking voters (see banner below). As a result, PCRM—which at the beginning of 2014 had an estimated rating of 35–40% and realistic chances of winning the elections—lost to PSRM, which started its campaign with a rating of approximately 1%.

Shortly after this electoral success, the Russian Federation continued to intervene directly in regional elections. In the 2015 campaign for the election of the Gagauzia governor, Russian deputies, artists, and athletes traveled to the region to support Irina Vlah’s candidacy, ensuring her victory. This ostentatious interference generated discontent among PSRM’s political opponents and those of Irina Vlah, who requested legislative changes to limit the involvement of foreign citizens in electoral campaigns.

A succinct expression of public indignation came from the deputy of the Gagauzia People’s Assembly, Ivan Burgudji, who **stated**: “With such support from Russia, even a Barbie doll would have won in Gagauzia.” Following these debates, in April 2015, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova **amended the Electoral Code**, prohibiting electoral contestants from involving “in any form persons who are not citizens of the Republic of Moldova in electioneering activities.”

Figure 1. Electoral Advertisement, 2014



## 4.3. Russian Interference in the Political and Electoral Processes of the Republic of Moldova after the Aggression against Ukraine

After the onset of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, the scale of Moscow’s interference in the political and electoral processes of the Republic of Moldova increased significantly. The entire arsenal of interference was detailed in a statement by President Maia Sandu following the Supreme Security Council meeting on 30 July 2025.

The main instrument used was the so-called “Șor network,” a structure comprising hundreds of thousands of individuals whose personal data were collected to receive user cards for the “MeriȘor” social stores.

In addition, thousands of people were recruited into social networks and illegal schemes for a fee. The network demonstrated its effectiveness as early as the spring 2023 campaign for the gubernatorial position, which is why Ilan Șor's services—convicted in the Republic of Moldova to 15 years in prison for “bank fraud”—were solicited by influence circles in Moscow.

In February 2024, Russia lifted Ilan Șor's entry ban, granted him Russian citizenship, and provided, through the “Evrazia” foundation, a fund of 250 million dollars to influence political processes in the Republic of Moldova. Political support was also provided at the highest level: the State Duma Speaker, Vyacheslav Volodin, is listed as chairman of the board of the “Evrazia” foundation.

This infrastructure was heavily used in the 2024 electoral campaigns—both the presidential elections and the constitutional referendum. On the threshold of the polls, at the request of the Governor of Gagauzia, the mayor of Orhei, and other local officials affiliated with the “Șor network,” the president of the Russian bank Promsvyazbank opened accounts for 138,000 Moldovan citizens, into which payments were transferred intended to influence votes against EU accession. Law enforcement authorities classified these actions as an attempt at mass voter bribery.

To counter this phenomenon, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted Law no. 100 on combating electoral corruption. This prevented the participation in the 2025 elections of the “Victoria Bloc”, formed in Moscow under Ilan Șor's leadership and composed of four Moldovan parties succeeding the Șor Party, declared unconstitutional.

The effect of not registering the “Victoria Bloc” and excluding its four component parties was immediate: opinion polls recorded a rapid increase in the rating of the Electoral Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova (BEP), which became the main beneficiary of the infrastructure and resources mobilized through the “Șor network.”

## V. DIVERGENT ISSUES WITH MAJOR IMPACT ON POST-ELECTORAL SCENARIOS

The electoral programs of political parties generally reflect both strategic visions for the development of the Republic of Moldova and specific promises to address socio-economic issues. Analyzing these programs is an essential tool for assessing party compatibility in the event of forming post-electoral alliances.

The experience of eleven legislatures shows that in six cases, governance resulted from coalitions, which required frequent compromises. While parties generally managed to reach consensus on socio-economic issues, major divergences appeared at the strategic level. Between 1991 and 2021, the main issues dividing the political class and society were:

- ⊙ the external integration vector (West vs. East),
- ⊙ national symbols (official language designation and history curriculum),
- ⊙ Transnistrian settlement (autonomy within a unitary state vs. federalization).

After the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Moldova's political agenda became even more polarized, with three additional issues joining the traditional ones:

- ⊙ energy independence and the relationship with Russia as a gas supplier,
- ⊙ constitutional neutrality and its implications in the context of regional security,
- ⊙ judicial reform, a key condition for European integration.

These six issues, combined with the personal relationships among the leaders of parties likely to surpass the electoral threshold, represent the key factors most likely to shape post-electoral negotiations and coalition configurations.

## 5.1. PAS's Position on Divergent Issues

Subject	PAS Position
External integration vector	Accession to the EU within the next 4 years
National symbols	Maintaining the status quo; application of the Constitutional Court decision ⇒ official language designated as "Romanian"
Transnistrian regulation	Gradual reintegration according to Law no. 173/2005, as part of the European integration process
Energy independence	Reducing dependence on Russia; renewable energy sources; interconnection with Romania; rejection of Gazprom's alleged debts
Neutrality	According to Constitutional Court Decision no. 14/2017 – neutrality ≠ passivity; includes the right to military defense
Judicial reform	Continuation and completion of vetting; exclusion of individuals lacking integrity
Interpersonal relations	Persistent tensions with leaders of other parties with electoral chances

*Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) - Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS)* aims, through the current parliamentary elections, to secure a new mandate to achieve its central strategic objective: the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union. [The PAS electoral program](#) focuses primarily on addressing socio-economic issues but also includes explicit positions on four of the six key contentious issues – European integration, Transnistrian settlement, energy independence, and judicial reform. Regarding the remaining two issues – national symbols and neutrality – PAS adopts a stance of maintaining the status quo, with targeted adjustments.

Thus, regarding **the external integration vector**, PAS advocates for gradual reintegration, based on Law No. 173/2005, which provides an autonomous status for districts on the left bank of the Dniester within the unitary state. This approach aligns with the country's European trajectory and assumes that EU accession could occur in stages: first for the constitutionally controlled territory, and subsequently for the Transnistrian region.

Concerning **the Transnistrian settlement**, PAS optează pentru o reintegrare graduală, în baza Legii nr. 173/2005, care prevede un statut de autonomie pentru raioanele din stânga Nistrului în cadrul statului unitar. Această abordare este integrată în parcursul european al țării și presupune că aderarea la UE ar putea fi realizată etapizat: mai întâi pentru teritoriul aflat sub control constituțional, iar ulterior și pentru regiunea transnistreană.

In **the energy sector**, the party emphasizes the definitive reduction of dependence on the Russian Federation, following Moscow's complete gas supply cutoff in 2024. PAS promotes diversification of energy sources through the European Energy Platform, increasing the share of renewable energy, completing interconnections with Romania, and enhancing domestic energy efficiency.

Regarding **neutrality**, PAS interprets this status in light of Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/2017, which establishes the authorities' obligation to take all necessary measures, including military ones, to deter an aggressor in the context of the illegal presence of Russian troops on national territory. This interpretation is contested by the opposition, which advocates adopting a special neutrality law modeled on the Georgian approach, eliminating any moral distinction between aggressor and victim.

On **judicial reform**, PAS commits to continuing the vetting process for judges and prosecutors to exclude individuals lacking integrity from the system. Politically, however, interpersonal relations between

PAS leaders and those of other parties likely to enter Parliament remain tense, limiting the space for post-electoral compromise negotiations.

## 5.2. Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova”

(BEP) - *Blocul electoral „Blocul Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Comuniștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei”* (BEP) was formed by the leaders of **four political parties** who, 10–15 years ago, were either part of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) or its governing apparatus. The disintegration of the PCRM under pressure from Russian external interference turned former party colleagues into political adversaries, who mutually labeled each other with epithets such as “traitors.” These reciprocal animosities prevented the PCRM from maintaining power in 2009 and from regaining government in 2014. They reunited to avoid vote fragmentation and to remove PAS from government. Despite its pro-Russian label, BEP emphasizes a “pro-Moldova” discourse focused on sovereignty and balance between East and West. Nevertheless, the statements and concrete actions of its leaders indicate a consistent alignment with Russia.

Among these, it is worth noting:

- ⊙ The bloc’s leaders – Igor Dodon and Irina Vlah – were the main beneficiaries of Russian interference in the 2014 and 2015 parliamentary elections. Both relaunched their political careers after the PCRM lost power in 2009 due to Russian support. The third bloc leader – former Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev – distinguished himself by creating and promoting the non-commercial organization “Friends of Russia in Moldova”;
- ⊙ PSRM leader Igor Dodon secured the support of Russian President Vladimir Putin for his political comeback by publicly endorsing Russia’s annexation of Crimea on the very day the Kremlin leader signed the decree, making irredentist claims against Ukraine: “In the new situation, I believe we should also recover our lost historical territories”;
- ⊙ PSRM leaders, together with the Governor of Gagauzia – Irina Vlah, established in Chisinau in April 2016 a branch of the Izborsk Club, whose statutory objectives include: “the creation of a strong political and ideological coalition of patriotic stateists – an imperial front...”. Igor Dodon is listed among the Club’s experts, whose ideology, presented in the work *The Path of Russia’s Victory*, advocates the restoration of the Russian Empire, including through glorifying military victories, particularly the victory in the 1941–1945 war. This ideology fully explains PSRM’s advocacy for celebrating the USSR’s victories, including in aggressive wars such as the 1939 invasion of Poland;
- ⊙ None of the BEP parties have ever condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, advocating for a peace conditional on Russia, which the Ukrainian leadership equates with capitulation.

Subject	BEP’s Position
External integration vector	“Bridge between East and West” – implicit renunciation of European integration
National symbols	Change of the official language name to Moldovan; official status for Russian; repeal of “Europe Day”
Transnistrian regulation	Resumption of negotiations in the “5+2” format; solution with special status, close to federalization
Energy independence	Long-term contract with Gazprom, fixed price \$200–300/1000 m <sup>3</sup> ; disregard of debt disputes
Neutrality	Elevated as a national identity element; refusal to distinguish between aggressor and victim
Judicial reform	Revision of reforms and CSM/CSP structures – risk of blocking European integration
Interpersonal relations	Cooperation among former rivals (Dodon, Vlah, Tarlev), but a history of conflict persists

BEP's electoral program and the public statements of its leaders address all six major points of divergence. Essentially, their positions can be summarized as follows:

- ⊙ **External integration vector** – BEP promotes the concept of “Moldova as a bridge between East and West,” interpreted as a tacit abandonment of European integration. The bloc proposes repealing the law establishing Europe Day and returning exclusively to the celebration of Victory Day, in line with the ideology of the Izborsk Club. This stance represents a break from European commitments, although some BEP leaders were previously official promoters of European integration.
- ⊙ **National symbols** – BEP supports amending language legislation by renaming the official language to “Moldovan” and granting Russian official status in interethnic communication. Such an initiative contradicts several Constitutional Court rulings and carries potential for political destabilization.
- ⊙ **Transnistrian conflict settlement** – resuming negotiations in the “5+2” format to identify a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution for the parties, prioritizing socio-economic reintegration, economic development, and infrastructure, while granting the Transnistrian region a special status within Moldova. These provisions have been enshrined for 20 years in Law no. 173 of 22-07-2005 on the basic provisions of the special legal status of localities on the left bank of the Dniester (Transnistria), a law drafted and adopted by the PCRM parliamentary majority. Therefore, it can be assumed that this represents a **disguised federalization** of Moldova, following the formula proposed by the PSRM leader in 2019. Accordingly, this is a highly sensitive issue that will prompt a review of the Gagauzia autonomy status and is likely to generate widespread protests, as occurred in 2003;
- ⊙ **Energy independence** – resumption of **direct natural gas deliveries** to Moldova after a change of power, concluding a long-term contract with GAZPROM (minimum 5 years) for gas delivery at a price not exceeding \$200–300 per 1000 m<sup>3</sup>, and fixing the final consumer price at 6–8 lei per 1 m<sup>3</sup>. This promise lacks crucial clarifications. One issue concerns the recognition by bloc leaders of approximately \$800 million in debt claimed by GAZPROM, which an international audit contracted by Moldovan authorities did not acknowledge, leading to a partial and then complete suspension of gas deliveries to Moldova. A second issue involves Transnistria’s \$11 billion debt, which some bloc representatives insist should be **considered shared**;
- ⊙ **Neutrality** – a key element of national identity, allowing Moldova to remain a space of peace and cooperation. In this regard, bloc leaders **praise Georgia**, which, despite having NATO accession enshrined in its constitution, promotes a neutral policy toward Russia, helping it circumvent Western sanctions imposed for aggression against Ukraine. According to BEP, this would be an example for Moldova to follow. The bloc ignores the fact that Russia violates Moldova’s neutral status. The Constitutional Court and several ECHR rulings have confirmed that Russian military presence guarantees the existence of the unconstitutional regime in Transnistria. The PCRM government, from the OSCE ministerial podium, declared Transnistria an occupied territory, which served as a pretext for Russian interference in the 2005 parliamentary elections and sanctions in 2006. Nevertheless, BEP refuses to associate neutrality with the withdrawal of Russian military presence from Moldova;
- ⊙ **Judicial reform** – revisiting reforms implemented over the past four years. BEP promises to reform the Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM) and the Superior Council of Prosecutors (CSP), which have just completed the vetting procedure. The demand to revise the judicial reform is a sure way to undermine Moldova’s European integration.

BEP’s positioning makes it the antithesis of PAS regarding European integration and the resolution of the most sensitive issues. This observation leads to the conclusion that post-electoral scenarios may feature two opposing poles of attraction if neither of the two antagonistic formations secures an absolute parliamentary majority.

### 5.3. BEA's position on the divergent issues

Subject	BEA Position
External integration vector	European integration is the main scenario for maintaining independence, modernizing the economy, and strengthening democracy.
National symbols	Official recognition of the state language name – Romanian.
Transnistrian regulation	Steps toward the EU only together with Transnistria; exclusively peaceful resolution, with EU involvement and guaranteed status for the region.
Energy independence	Strengthening energy independence and reducing costs; deep sector reform; compensation of losses by the PAS government.
Neutrality	Adoption of a special law on neutrality and obtaining international recognition of neutral state status.
Judicial reform	Strong criticism of the current reform; proposal for specialization of judges; elimination of interference by CSM and court presidents; legislative amendments to consider professional evaluations.

BEA positions itself as a pro-European alternative to PAS. This stance prompted PAS to launch a critical campaign against the bloc, arguing that BEA cannot represent a credible European option, as some of its leaders previously belonged to PCRM and PSRM. However, Moldova's political experience shows the opposite: parties and their leaders can adjust their orientations and political visions. A striking example is 2002, when PCRM, despite holding a popular mandate for integration into the Russia–Belarus Union, abandoned this objective and promoted European integration. Currently, some socialist and social-democratic formations have suddenly adopted conservative and sovereigntist orientations.

BEA's electoral program primarily focuses on addressing socio-economic and demographic issues. Most divergent topics are approached from the perspective of European Union accession. BEA's stance on these six issues can be summarized as follows:

- ⊙ **External integration vector** – European integration is perceived as the primary scenario to preserve Moldova's independence, modernize the economy, improve quality of life, and strengthen democratic consolidation.
- ⊙ **National symbols** – BEA recognizes the official designation of the state language as Romanian.
- ⊙ **Transnistrian settlement** – Every step toward EU integration must be undertaken in coordination with Transnistria, involving the European Union in the exclusively peaceful resolution of the conflict and granting the region a guaranteed status.
- ⊙ **Energy independence** – Strengthening energy independence and reducing costs for gas, electricity, and heating. The bloc proposes a comprehensive reform of the energy sector and considers that losses incurred by citizens and the economy should be compensated by the PAS government, held responsible for the energy crisis.
- ⊙ **Neutrality** – Moldova's European trajectory should be accompanied by the consolidation of its neutral status. BEA proposes adopting a special law on neutrality and securing international recognition of Moldova as a neutral state.
- ⊙ **Judicial reform** – According to BEA, the judicial system has been compromised, and the rule of law replaced by an authoritarian regime. The bloc proposes developing the specialization of judges, applying it uniformly across all courts without interference from the Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM) or court presidents, and amending legislation so that CSM and the Supreme Court of Justice consider judges' and prosecutors' evaluation results in their appointment and promotion.

## 5.4. PN's Position on Divergent Issues

Subject	PN Position
External integration vector	Does not explicitly contest EU accession, but implicitly does so through constitutional proposals that contradict European recommendations; proposes Schengen accession as the ultimate goal.
National symbols	No clear stance; accepts the status quo in any form.
Transnistrian regulation	Proposes negotiations and transforming the right bank of the Dniester into an attractive area for the population from the left bank.
Energy independence	No developed vision; supports purchasing gas from any supplier offering a favorable price.
Neutrality	"Neutrality is the guarantee of security: no NATO and no Russian army!"
Judicial reform	Challenges PAS reform; considers it a political plan to remove inconvenient judges and prosecutors and subordinate the judiciary.

Our Party (PN) presents itself as a non-systemic political entity. In fact, it is the only party among the 66 registered with the Public Services Agency (ASP) that does not claim adherence to any particular doctrine or ideology. Through this positioning, PN asserts that it focuses exclusively on what truly matters for the interests of citizens, especially the development of the social sphere.

The declared goal of PN, stated in its statutory documents, is the elaboration of a Development Plan for Moldova, meant to attract specialists and experts from any ideological orientation. For the implementation of this Plan, the party's political program envisions a transition to a presidential form of government, which would require drafting and adopting a new Constitution. In this regard, [PN's electoral program](#) contains at least 15% of concrete promises requiring constitutional amendments, including:

1. Reducing the number of members of Parliament from 101 to 51;
2. Abolishing parliamentary immunity;
3. Stripping deputies of their mandate for floor-crossing, which implies introducing the imperative mandate;
4. Amending the Constitution with provisions on pension indexation;
5. Constitutionally prohibiting the sale of agricultural land to foreign citizens;
6. Abolishing compulsory military service;
7. Eliminating district councils.





PN's stance on the six divergent issues is diffuse and can be described as follows:

- ⊙ **External integration vector** – PN does not explicitly oppose EU accession but implicitly challenges it through certain constitutional amendment proposals that disregard the opinions of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission. PN suggests that the process of European integration should culminate in potential accession to the Schengen Area.
- ⊙ **National symbols** – PN has never taken a clear-cut position in public disputes regarding symbols, implicitly accepting the status quo in whichever form it exists.
- ⊙ **Transnistrian settlement** – PN sporadically addresses the Transnistrian issue, proposing negotiations and the transformation of the right bank of the Dniester into an attractive area for the population on the left bank.
- ⊙ **Energy independence** – PN does not have a detailed vision in this field. The only publicly stated position is the purchase of gas from any supplier offering a more advantageous price.
- ⊙ **Neutrality** – PN approaches this issue in a specific manner, summing it up in the slogan: *"Neutrality is the guarantee of security: no NATO and no Russian army!"*.
- ⊙ **Judicial reform** – PN argues that the judicial reform promoted by PAS has nothing to do with the real fight against corruption but was instead [a plan](#) to eliminate inconvenient judges and prosecutors in order to subordinate the justice system to political interests.

## 5.5. Compatibility Matrix

The attitudes of the main political parties toward the six polarizing issues, as outlined above, allow for a synthetic, visual representation—based on the traffic light principle—of the compatibility between parties in forming potential post-electoral alliances.

Table 5. Matrix of Attitudes toward Divergent Issues

	EXTERNAL VECTOR OF INTEGRATION	NATIONAL SYMBOLS	TRANSNISTRIAN SETTLEMENT	ENERGY INDEPENDENCE	NEUTRALITY	JUSTICE REFORM
	EU accession	Maintaining the name of the Romanian language as the official language and preserving the history course of Romanians in schools	Autonomy status within the unitary state - in accordance with art. 111 of the Constitution and Law no. 173	Avoiding Russia's energy blackmail. Rejecting Gazprom's claims regarding an alleged \$800 million debt. Renewable sources and interconnection with Romania	Withdrawal of the Russian military presence from the Transnistrian region as a guarantee of constitutional neutrality. The need to strengthen defense	Continuation of the reform begun
	Bridge between East and West	Changing the name of the language to Moldovan; official status for the Russian language; repeal of "Europe Day"	Federalization in disguise	Restoring contracts with Gazprom, without clarifying the alleged \$800 million debt and the \$11 billion debt accumulated by the Transnistrian region	Giving up any intention of retaliation by the aggressor. Giving up the delimitation of the aggressor from the victim of aggression	Review of the constitution of the Superior Council of Judges and the Superior Council of Prosecutors
	EU accession, only together with Transnistria	Maintaining the designation of the Romanian language as the official language and preserving the history course of Romanians in schools. Nuanced emphasis on the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities	Regulation through negotiations, with EU involvement to demonstrate the advantages of joining the European community	Deep reform of the energy sector. The current government is to blame for the energy disaster	Raising neutrality to the level of a national symbol against any war. Special law on neutrality and international recognition of the status of a neutral state	The principled challenge to justice reform
	Accession to the Schengen Area, without EU accession	The neutral attitude towards maintaining the name of the Romanian language and preserving the history course of Romanians in schools	Regulating the conflict through negotiations, becoming attractive to those on the left bank of the Nistru River	Negotiating with any supplier, including from the Russian Federation, for better natural gas prices	Neutrality is the guarantee of security. Without NATO and without the Russian army	The principled challenge to justice reform

Starting from the fact that PAS has governed the Republic of Moldova for the past four years and bears responsibility for the situation across all areas, including the six domains generating divergences, it is logical to assume that the party will maintain its current positions moving forward. Therefore, in the above matrix, PAS's attitudes are marked in green. The opposing positions of BEP are marked in red. Accordingly, the stances of the potential allies—BEA and PN—of the two antagonistic parties are represented in shaded colors: green if closer to PAS, or red if closer to BEP. Yellow indicates either a lack of interest in the respective issues or the existence of room for negotiations and compromises.

## VI. POST-ELECTORAL SCENARIOS WITH HIGH PROBABILITY

According to the rules of combinatorics, four electoral parties can generate 15 possible formulas for a parliamentary majority: single-party governments (4), binary coalitions (6), tripartite coalitions (4), and one coalition including all four parties (1). To these, one may add the additional scenario of post-electoral destabilization, with consequences difficult to predict. The probability of this outcome depends on how law enforcement bodies react to the risks highlighted by the Head of State in statements following the Supreme Security Council meeting and in the address to citizens.

Taking into account the experience of the 11 previous legislatures and the trends reflected in opinion polls, realistic scenarios narrow down to a few more probable formulas:

- 1. Single-party governments.** Although the probability is not high, scenarios in which PAS or BEP obtain an absolute majority must be analyzed for methodological clarity. Nevertheless, empirical data suggest that the chances of majority coalitions outweigh those of single-party governments.
- 2. Binary coalition governments.** The most likely scenarios involve forming coalitions between PAS or BEP, on the one hand, and BEA or PN, on the other. The compatibility matrix suggests that the probability of pro-EU coalitions (with PAS) is approximately equivalent to that of pro-Russia coalitions (with BEP). Still, external and internal factors may decisively influence the final configuration.

3. **Tripartite governments.** The political experience of the Republic of Moldova shows that tripartite or multipartite alliances are unstable and crisis-prone. The examples of the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (ADR), the Alliance for European Integration (AIE), or the PSRM–ACUM Bloc coalition confirm the fragility of such formulas. Consequently, the probability of tripartite governments in the new legislature is reduced.

### Forward-looking factors with unpredictable impact

**The Ukrainian factor.** Any coalition formed after the elections will be directly influenced by developments in Ukraine. If Ukraine manages to consolidate its independence and sovereignty, BEA might be tempted to join a pro-EU coalition, even at the cost of internal compromises. Conversely, an unfavorable scenario for Kyiv would render a pro-Russian government vulnerable, exposed to the risk of international isolation. In this context, the warning of former Ukrainian Ambassador to Chişinău, Marko Shevchenko, is relevant: *“Ukraine might close its border with the Republic of Moldova if pro-Russian parties, advocating for a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation, come to power.”*

**The political ambitions of leaders.** Coalition formation will not depend only on programmatic compatibilities but also on the forward-looking interests of political leaders, given the proximity of the presidential cycle:

- ⊙ **PAS** currently lacks a competitive successor for the period after Maia Sandu’s second mandate.
- ⊙ **BEP**, particularly PSRM, has a compromised leader who avoided direct confrontation in the last presidential elections, preferring an external candidate.
- ⊙ **BEA** has three leaders with presidential ambitions, whose chances may be amplified or diminished depending on whether they choose a pro-EU or pro-Russia coalition.
- ⊙ **PN** promotes the idea of a “national consensus” coalition, which is impossible in the context of PAS–BEP antagonism. Its insistence on changing the Constitution and shifting to a presidential regime betrays the personal ambitions of its leader, highlighting the fragility of any governing formula in which the party might participate.

### SCENARIO 1.



#### PAS PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY – PROBABLE VERSION

- FOREIGN INTEGRATION VECTOR
- NATIONAL SYMBOLS
- TRANSNISTRIAN SETTLEMENT
- ENERGY INDEPENDENCE
- NEUTRALITY
- JUSTICE REFORM

If it obtains a parliamentary majority, PAS will firmly continue the course of European integration, strengthening energy independence, gradually applying the reintegration of the Transnistrian region, reinforcing justice through vetting, and ensuring the country’s security within the limits of constitutional neutrality. It will capitalize on the financial resources offered by the EU.

**Advantages for PAS** – EU support, institutional cooperation, Ukraine’s resilience. **Risks for PAS** – shortage of qualified staff, vulnerability to external pressures, dependence on the president’s approval rating.

According to estimates based on opinion polls and the diaspora vote share, PAS could accumulate approximately 40% of the ballots, which would translate into around 47 parliamentary mandates. However, the final results depend on the turnout rate both domestically and abroad, as well as the effects of external interference through the “Șor network.” Thus, PAS’s electoral score should be considered within a  $\pm 5\%$  margin of variation.

If PAS were to obtain an absolute majority in Parliament, governance would broadly follow the directions already established during its first mandate:

- ⊙ **Domestic policy** would be subordinated to the central objective of foreign policy – European integration. Accession negotiations would be accompanied by the gradual adoption of the EU acquis.
- ⊙ **Socio-economic policies**, as presented in the electoral program, would require consolidation of the executive branch and securing broader support – both from pro-European parties and from the majority of the population.
- ⊙ **Security policies** would focus on non-military dimensions, aiming at reducing energy dependence, countering external interference, and dismantling the “Șor network.”

#### Factors favorable to PAS governance:

- ⊙ Political and financial support from European institutions for the integration process;
- ⊙ Ukraine’s resilience against Russian aggression, which indirectly functions as a “shield” for the Republic of Moldova;
- ⊙ Cooperation among state institutions – Government, Parliament, and Presidency – with possible synergistic effects on governance.

#### Factors unfavorable to PAS governance:

- ⊙ **Limited human resources.** PAS is perceived as a rigid formation with a deficit of creativity, especially in public communication. Many formal party leaders enjoy a lower level of trust compared to opposition leaders. PAS’s relatively high popularity is largely explained by the personal rating of the Head of State, who acts as the party’s informal leader.
- ⊙ **Target of external interference.** As long as the war in Ukraine continues, PAS governance will remain exposed to pressures from the Russian Federation, particularly in the energy sector and in the Transnistrian dossier.

## SCENARIO 2.



### PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY BEP – A LESS LIKELY, BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE, SCENARIO



If it obtains a parliamentary majority, BEP will put European integration on hold, promote the redefinition of national symbols (the Moldovan language and official status for the Russian language), resume negotiations for a camouflaged federalization of the Republic of Moldova, restore energy dependence on Gazprom, and revise justice reform, with the risk of undermining sovereignty and political stability.

**Advantages for BEP** – political and financial support from Russia, access to the eastern market, “Șor” resources. **Risks for BEP** – loss of EU support, harsh reactions from Ukraine, social and internal political destabilization.

Estimates indicate that BEP could accumulate approximately 30% of the voters' ballots, which would translate into around 35 parliamentary mandates. Being the main beneficiary of the "Șor network" after the exclusion of the "Victoria" Bloc from the electoral competition, BEP could even surpass the 40-mandate threshold. However, within the limits of the electoral probability model, it is extremely difficult to justify the acquisition of an absolute parliamentary majority by BEP. Nonetheless, hypothetically, the scenario of a single-party majority can be considered.

In such a case, BEP governance could pursue the following directions:

- ⊙ **Foreign policy** – de facto suspension of the European integration process, which would lead to a gradual halt in EU financial support. BEP would not immediately renounce the status of a candidate country for accession, but relations with the European Union would gradually deteriorate due to programmatic policies and declarations, including the commitment to adopt the law on foreign agents, previously promoted by the Socialists and Communists Bloc, as well as the intention to repeal the Law on Europe Day.
- ⊙ **Domestic policy** – revision of reforms implemented over the past four years, especially in the justice sector. The first targets would be the Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM) and the Superior Council of Prosecutors (CSP). Subsequently, heads of public institutions with fixed mandates could be dismissed under the pretext of "politicization."
- ⊙ **Social policies** – postponement of the implementation of certain electoral promises in the absence of financial resources, until alternative sources are identified, most likely in Russia or China. It is expected that the opposition would appeal to the Constitutional Court regarding some loan agreements, generating institutional conflicts. Any social difficulties would be attributed to the "harmful legacy" left by previous governments.
- ⊙ **Energy security** – direct contracting with Gazprom for gas supplies at lower prices in exchange for recognition of the alleged \$800 million debt. This decision would increase Moldova's energy dependence and nullify previous efforts toward energy independence.
- ⊙ **State sovereignty and independence** – exposed to risk through the promotion of a disguised federalization, following the Kozak model, invoked by Igor Dodon in 2019. This would also involve revising the special legal status of Gagauzia, returning to the formula of the 2003 Kozak Memorandum, with three federal subjects, at least two of which would be under Russian influence. Such federalization, combined with renewed energy dependence, would reduce Moldova's sovereignty and independence to a formal level, similar to Belarus, which allowed the use of its territory in the aggression against Ukraine.
- ⊙ **Internal destabilization** – implementing BEP promises regarding the modification of national symbols and federalization would generate major social and political tensions, comparable to those in 2002–2003. At that time, although PCRM had a constitutional majority sufficient to integrate Moldova into the Russia–Belarus Union, internal and external pressures forced a shift in political course toward European integration, formalized by the presidential decree of November 13, 2002.

#### **Factors favorable to BEP governance:**

- ⊙ Political, financial, and propaganda support from the Russian Federation and its allied authoritarian regimes;
- ⊙ Expanded access for Moldovan products to the Russian market and allied markets, though with logistical difficulties;
- ⊙ Transfer of resources from the "Șor network" to BEP, either directly or by making them available to the bloc.


#### **Factors unfavorable to BEP governance:**

- ⊙ Immediate cessation of financial support from the European Union;
- ⊙ Firm reactions from Ukraine, which would perceive a pro-Russian government as a direct threat to its security, including through the possible restriction of natural gas transit.

### SCENARIO 3.



#### GOVERNING COALITION PAS & BEA – MEDIUM PROBABILITY



**Configuration:** PAS would have three times more seats than BEA and would be the pivot of the coalition.

**Governance directions:** Such a formula would ensure continuity of the European integration path, but at a slower pace and with risks of internal tensions. Divergences on justice, energy security, and the Transnistrian issue would require compromises. A clear distribution of areas of responsibility and the management of the institutional framework would be essential.

**Advantages** – maintaining the pro-EU direction, strengthening the arithmetic of governance. **Risks** – interpersonal conflict between leaders, different interpretations of neutrality (especially regarding Ukraine), the perception of BEA as an “alternative” rather than a partner.

A potential PAS & BEA coalition would pivot around the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), due to its significantly larger share of parliamentary mandates, estimated at roughly three times that of BEA. Such a coalition is expected to generate the following effects:


- ⊙ **EU accession policies** – continuity of the European integration path would be ensured, but at a slower pace, as BEA leaders would avoid losing their political identity by dissolving into a PAS-dominated government.
- ⊙ **Internal and pro-European governance policies** – significant adjustments would be needed in areas identified as divergent in the compatibility matrix: justice reform, energy security, and Transnistrian settlement.
- ⊙ **Personnel policy** – would require a thorough revision, with a clear distribution of responsibilities among coalition components and ensuring functional synergy.
- ⊙ **Security policies** – could become a point of contention, particularly regarding relations with Ukraine. The central issue would be the interpretation of neutrality: either with discernment and clear moral distinctions between aggressor and victim, or strictly amoral, of the “only commercial cooperation matters, regardless of the party involved” type.
- ⊙ **Neutrality** – an immoral interpretation could lead toward a “Georgian model,” which would provoke negative reactions from the European Union, which considers security a priority for integration.

The main obstacle to forming a PAS & BEA coalition is the **interpersonal factor**. In negotiations, the two parties would face the dilemma: what is more important – achieving the country’s strategic goal of European integration, or perpetuating conflicts and mutual hostility? This issue is reinforced by BEA’s very name, suggesting it sees itself as an alternative to PAS in promoting European integration, rather than as a partner. Conversely, PAS has built part of its electoral strategy on vehemently challenging BEA’s claims to be a promoter of European integration, citing the past political affiliations of some of its leaders in PCRM and PSRM.

Thus, the strategies of both parties appear more antagonistic than constructive. If PAS and BEA genuinely aim to maintain Moldova on the European integration path, continued mutual confrontation could constitute a major strategic error.

Overall, a PAS & BEA coalition could produce both positive and negative effects, depending on the ability of the two formations to overcome rivalry and prioritize national interest over political disputes.

#### SCENARIO 4.



#### GOVERNING COALITION BEP & BEA – MODERATE PROBABILITY

**Configuration:** The pivot would be BEP. The mandates of the two blocs might be insufficient without the support of the Our Party, which would generate instability.

**Governance directions:** An alliance with different strategic vectors. The process of European integration could be suspended, EU financial support reduced, while Russia/China would become the main partners. Trade with Russia and dependence on its gas would return to the forefront, with negative effects on the economy and security.

**Advantages** – BEP would gain room for maneuver and could avoid destabilizing promises. **Risks** – BEA would compromise its pro-European credibility, risking the loss of political identity or even disintegration. Ukraine’s reaction would limit the application of the “Georgian model.”

The formation of a coalition between BEP and BEA would essentially contradict the declared strategic objectives of the two parties, since both promote – at least at a rhetorical level – regional integration along different vectors. Nevertheless, such an alliance is not excluded, its probability depending largely on the degree of animosity between the leaders of BEA and PAS. Unlike the conflictual BEA–PAS relationship, in the case of BEP–BEA there are no major interpersonal obstacles.

However, the number of seats held by the two blocs could be insufficient to form a stable parliamentary majority without the involvement of Our Party (PN). Including PN would turn the coalition into a fragile and instability-prone construction.

In the event of a BEP–BEA coalition, BEP would become the pivot of governance. The impact on the international relations of the Republic of Moldova would, to a certain extent, reproduce the “Georgian model”:


- ⊙ the process of European integration would be suspended indefinitely;
- ⊙ financial support from the European Union would be drastically reduced, with attempts to substitute it through assistance offered by Russia or China;
- ⊙ the resumption of trade with Russia, including dual-use goods that could support the war against Ukraine, would be conditioned on access for Moldovan products to the Russian market and the supply of natural gas at preferential prices, with unpredictable effects;
- ⊙ the national economy would experience a temporary decline, at least until a possible substitution of European support by Russia or China;
- ⊙ the internal situation would be destabilized in the event of attempts to revise national symbols and the legal framework regarding the Transnistrian settlement.

Still, the application of the “Georgian model” in the case of the Republic of Moldova is problematic. Unlike Georgia, the Republic of Moldova does not share a border with the Russian Federation, and Ukraine has sufficient instruments to discourage any attempt by Chişinău to align with Moscow’s interests.

The main beneficiaries of such a coalition would be BEP, which could use the partnership to justify avoiding destabilizing electoral promises, citing the need for compromises with BEA.

The losers, in the medium and long term, would be BEA's leaders themselves. By associating with BEP, BEA would compromise its pro-European credibility, risking being perceived as an opportunistic party. Under such conditions, even the disintegration of BEA as a distinct political entity cannot be excluded.

## SCENARIO 5.



A potential coalition between PAS and Our Party (PN) is possible, but the chances of it being stable are limited. In such an alliance, PN would be obliged to adopt PAS's strategic objective – European integration – with certain adjustments, abandoning the idea of a broad national consensus coalition, as well as its intention to adopt a new Constitution aimed at establishing a presidential form of governance.


On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that PAS would agree to provide PN opportunities to advance its leader's presidential ambitions. Nevertheless, such a coalition cannot be excluded in the event of an imminent risk of early elections caused by the inability to invest the government.

In this scenario, the pivot of governance would be PAS, but PN would most likely insist on taking at least two key ministries, such as the **Ministry of Internal Affairs** and the **Ministry of Infrastructure and Regional Development**.

The anticipated effects of a PAS & PN coalition could be the following:

- ⊙ **EU accession policies** – would continue, but the pace of the process would be significantly slowed;
- ⊙ **Internal and European integration policies** – would require major adjustments, especially in budgetary and social policy, which are priorities for PN, as well as in the field of justice;
- ⊙ **Personnel policy** – would undergo fundamental revision, requiring a clear delineation of responsibilities between the two formations and identification of cooperation mechanisms;
- ⊙ **Security policies** – would become a source of major tensions, given PN's stance on the concept of neutrality.

## SCENARIO 6.



### GOVERNING COALITION BEP & PN – UNLIKELY

**Configuration:** Such a coalition is improbable, both due to the uncertain number of mandates and the interpersonal tensions between the leaders of BEP and PN. The formula would only be viable within a broader construction (BEP–BEA–PN), but with a high degree of instability.

**Governance directions:** European integration would be suspended, EU financial support reduced, and Russia/China would become the main partners. Trade with Russia and gas dependence would be resumed, with unpredictable effects on the economy and security.

**Advantages** – alternative external support, access to the Russian market.  
**Risks** – temporary economic decline, internal destabilization through the revision of national symbols and the Transnistrian file, increased vulnerability due to divergences between the leaders of BEP and PN.

A governing coalition between BEP and Our Party (PN) is unlikely. Firstly, it is uncertain whether the number of mandates held by the two formations would be sufficient to form a stable parliamentary majority. Under such circumstances, such a coalition could only be viable in the **BEP & BEA & PN** formula, which would, however, exhibit a much higher degree of instability, typical of tripartite structures.

In the event of a BEP & PN coalition, the potential consequences could be the following:

- ⊙ **European integration process** – would be put on hold for an indefinite period;
- ⊙ **EU financial support** – would be substantially reduced, likely to be replaced by support from Russia or China;
- ⊙ **Trade with Russia** – resumption of trade, including exports of dual-use goods supporting Russia's war effort, in exchange for access to the Russian market for Moldovan products and the delivery of natural gas at lower prices, would have unpredictable consequences;
- ⊙ **Temporary economic decline** – until potential replacement of EU support with resources provided by Russia or China;
- ⊙ **Internal destabilization** – caused by potential attempts to revise national symbols and the framework for Transnistrian regulation.

An essential factor that could further complicate the formation of this coalition is the **highly tense interpersonal relationships between BEP and PN leaders**.

## SCENARIO 7. INABILITY TO FORM A MAJORITY COALITION – VERY LOW PROBABILITY

The hypothesis of being unable to form a parliamentary majority within the time limits set by the Constitution cannot be excluded, as interpreted and developed through a series of rulings by the Constitutional Court.

In such a situation, the Republic of Moldova would enter a **deep political crisis**, which could last for at least six months until a new parliamentary election is organized.

Under these circumstances, the polarization of the political spectrum would be extremely pronounced, and the electorate would tend to vote predominantly for formations representing the two major poles

– **pro-EU** and **pro-Russia**. The main attractors would certainly be **PAS** and **PSRM**. A similar situation occurred during the parliamentary elections of **July 29, 2009**, convened following the political crisis triggered by the events of **April 7, 2009**.

It is highly unlikely that **BEA** and **PN** would benefit from such a scenario, which is why these formations would prefer to participate in the formation of post-electoral alliances according to the scenarios already described.

## **SCENARIO 8. POST-ELECTORAL DESTABILIZATION – PROBABILITY CANNOT BE IGNORED**

The calls by the BEP leader to organize protests immediately after the conclusion of the elections, regardless of the results obtained, **evoke the risk of repeating the “April 7, 2009 syndrome”**, when peaceful demonstrations announced by the opposition escalated into violence and acts of vandalism caused by unidentified factors to this day.

In 2009, law enforcement was caught off guard and lacked the necessary capacity to prevent and counter the escalation of violence. Currently, there is precise information regarding the **paid mobilization of protest participants by the leader of the “Şor network.”**

In this context, and taking into account the conclusions of the **Supreme Security Council (SSC) on July 30, 2025**, public order structures must be properly prepared to address potential provocations and prevent protests from turning into destabilizing actions.