





TYPES OF POSSIBLE MAJORITIES

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2025, MOLDOVA

Scenario type	Variants	Overall assessment
Single-party governments	1. PAS; 2. BEP;	Possible only in the case of an exceptional result
Binary coalitions	3. PAS + BEA; 4. PAS + PN; 5. BEP + BEA; 4. BEP + PN	Most probable, based on arithmetic and selective proximities
Tripartite coalitions	7. PAS + BEA + PN; 8. BEP + BEA + PN; other theoretical mixes	Feasible only on paper, fragile due to ideological divergences
Destabilizing scenario	Prolonged crises, protests, snap elections	The risk of contestation and external interference evokes the "April 7, 2009 syndrome"





FORECAST: RESULTS AND SEAT DISTRIBUTION

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2025, MOLDOVA

	Vote share (domestic only)	Seats (domestic only)	Vote share (with diaspora)	Seats (with diaspora)
	35,4%	42	41%	47
	31,8%	38	29%	35
	9,6%	11	9%	10
	8,8%	10	8%	9

The analysis of post-election scenarios for the parliamentary election of September 28, 2025, is conducted within the framework of the "Informed Choice 2025" project, implemented by the ADEPT Association with financial support from the Soros Foundation Moldova.
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ATTITUDES OF COMPETITORS TOWARD DIVERGENT ISSUES

	EXTERNAL VECTOR OF INTEGRATION	NATIONAL SYMBOLS	TRANSNISTRIAN SETTLEMENT	ENERGY INDEPENDENCE	NEUTRALITY	JUSTICE REFORM
	EU accession	Maintaining the name of the Romanian language as the official language and preserving the history course of Romanians in schools	Autonomy status within the unitary state - in accordance with art. 111 of the Constitution and Law no. 173	Avoiding Russia's energy blackmail. Rejecting Gazprom's claims regarding an alleged \$800 million debt. Renewable sources and interconnection with Romania	Withdrawal of the Russian military presence from the Transnistrian region as a guarantee of constitutional neutrality. The need to strengthen defense	Continuation of the reform begun
	Bridge between East and West	Changing the name of the language to Moldovan; official status for the Russian language; repeal of "Europe Day"	Federalization in disguise	Restoring contracts with Gazprom, without clarifying the alleged \$800 million debt and the \$11 billion debt accumulated by the Transnistrian region	Giving up any intention of retaliation by the aggressor. Giving up the delimitation of the aggressor from the victim of aggression	Review of the constitution of the Superior Council of Judges and the Superior Council of Prosecutors
	EU accession, only together with Transnistria	Maintaining the designation of the Romanian language as the official language and preserving the history course of Romanians in schools. Nuanced emphasis on the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities	Regulation through negotiations, with EU involvement to demonstrate the advantages of joining the European community	Deep reform of the energy sector. The current government is to blame for the energy disaster	Raising neutrality to the level of a national symbol against any war. Special law on neutrality and international recognition of the status of a neutral state	The principled challenge to justice reform
	Accession to the Schengen Area, without EU accession	The neutral attitude towards maintaining the name of the Romanian language and preserving the history course of Romanians in schools	Regulating the conflict through negotiations, becoming attractive to those on the left bank of the Nistru River	Negotiating with any supplier, including from the Russian Federation, for better natural gas prices	Neutrality is the guarantee of security. Without NATO and without the Russian army	The principled challenge to justice reform

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PAS PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY – PROBABLE VERSION

FOREIGN INTEGRATION
VECTOR

NATIONAL SYMBOLS

TRANSNISTRIAN
SETTLEMENT

ENERGY
INDEPENDENCE

NEUTRALITY

JUSTICE REFORM

If it obtains a parliamentary majority, PAS will firmly continue the course of European integration, strengthening energy independence, gradually applying the reintegration of the Transnistrian region, reinforcing justice through vetting, and ensuring the country's security within the limits of constitutional neutrality. It will capitalize on the financial resources offered by the EU.

Advantages for PAS – EU support, institutional cooperation, Ukraine's resilience. **Risks for PAS** – shortage of qualified staff, vulnerability to external pressures, dependence on the president's approval rating.



PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY BEP – A LESS LIKELY, BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE, SCENARIO

FOREIGN INTEGRATION
VECTOR

NATIONAL SYMBOLS

TRANSNISTRIAN
SETTLEMENT

ENERGY
INDEPENDENCE

NEUTRALITY

JUSTICE REFORM

If it obtains a parliamentary majority, BEP will put European integration on hold, promote the redefinition of national symbols (the Moldovan language and official status for the Russian language), resume negotiations for a camouflaged federalization of the Republic of Moldova, restore energy dependence on Gazprom, and revise justice reform, with the risk of undermining sovereignty and political stability.

Advantages for BEP – political and financial support from Russia, access to the eastern market, “Şor” resources. **Risks for BEP** – loss of EU support, harsh reactions from Ukraine, social and internal political destabilization.



GOVERNING COALITION PAS & BEA – MEDIUM PROBABILITY

FOREIGN INTEGRATION
VECTOR

NATIONAL SYMBOLS

TRANSNISTRIAN
SETTLEMENT

ENERGY
INDEPENDENCE

NEUTRALITY

JUSTICE REFORM

INTERPERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS

Configuration: PAS would have three times more seats than BEA and would be the pivot of the coalition.

Governance directions: Such a formula would ensure continuity of the European integration path, but at a slower pace and with risks of internal tensions. Divergences on justice, energy security, and the Transnistrian issue would require compromises. A clear distribution of areas of responsibility and the management of the institutional framework would be essential.

Advantages – maintaining the pro-EU direction, strengthening the arithmetic of governance. **Risks** – interpersonal conflict between leaders, different interpretations of neutrality (especially regarding Ukraine), the perception of BEA as an “alternative” rather than a partner.



GOVERNING COALITION BEP & BEA – MODERATE PROBABILITY

FOREIGN INTEGRATION
VECTOR

NATIONAL SYMBOLS

TRANSNISTRIAN
SETTLEMENT

ENERGY
INDEPENDENCE

NEUTRALITY

JUSTICE REFORM

INTERPERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS

Configuration: The pivot would be BEP. The mandates of the two blocs might be insufficient without the support of the Our Party, which would generate instability.

Governance directions: An alliance with different strategic vectors. The process of European integration could be suspended, EU financial support reduced, while Russia/China would become the main partners. Trade with Russia and dependence on its gas would return to the forefront, with negative effects on the economy and security.

Advantages – BEP would gain room for maneuver and could avoid destabilizing promises. **Risks** – BEA would compromise its pro-European credibility, risking the loss of political identity or even disintegration. Ukraine's reaction would limit the application of the "Georgian model."



GOVERNING COALITION PAS & PN – MODERATE PROBABILITY

FOREIGN INTEGRATION
VECTOR

NATIONAL SYMBOLS

TRANSNISTRIAN
SETTLEMENT

ENERGY
INDEPENDENCE

NEUTRALITY

JUSTICE REFORM

INTERPERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS

Configuration: A PAS–PN alliance is possible, but with low chances of stability. PN would have to accept PAS’s strategic objective – European integration – by abandoning the idea of a new Constitution and the presidential model desired by its leader. The coalition could emerge in times of crisis, in order to avoid early elections.

Governance directions: The pivot would be PAS, but PN would demand control over two key ministries (e.g., Internal Affairs, Infrastructure). European policies would continue, but at a slower pace, while domestically adjustments would be needed in budget, social policies, and justice.

Advantages – avoiding political deadlock and early elections, continuity of the European path. **Risks** – slowdown of reforms, major tensions over justice reform, conflicts regarding the division of responsibilities, and PN’s presidential ambitions.



GOVERNING COALITION BEP & PN – UNLIKELY

FOREIGN INTEGRATION
VECTOR

NATIONAL SYMBOLS

TRANSNISTRIAN
SETTLEMENT

ENERGY
INDEPENDENCE

NEUTRALITY

JUSTICE REFORM

INTERPERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS

Configuration: Such a coalition is improbable, both due to the uncertain number of mandates and the interpersonal tensions between the leaders of BEP and PN. The formula would only be viable within a broader construction (BEP–BEA–PN), but with a high degree of instability.

Governance directions: European integration would be suspended, EU financial support reduced, and Russia/China would become the main partners. Trade with Russia and gas dependence would be resumed, with unpredictable effects on the economy and security.

Advantages – alternative external support, access to the Russian market.
Risks – temporary economic decline, internal destabilization through the revision of national symbols and the Transnistrian file, increased vulnerability due to divergences between the leaders of BEP and PN.