The draft law on the status of foreign agents, introduced by MPs from the Bloc of Communists and Socialists (BCS), contains numerous fundamental shortcomings and stands in clear contradiction with the legislation and policies previously promoted by the very parties that make up the BCS. The argument that such a law is required due to the dangers of globalization clashes directly with their own public statements, which appear to support a Chinese-style model of globalization while simultaneously opposing European regionalization and EU principles — principles that they themselves endorsed in the past through policy initiatives, government programs, and legislation aimed at advancing European integration.

Moreover, the claim that the BCS bill is inspired by legislation from democratic states is at best a half-truth. While the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938 is invoked, the historical context is deliberately omitted — a period marked by the infiltration of Nazi and Comintern agents — as is the fact that FARA required only the registration of individuals acting under a clear foreign mandate, without stigmatizing or publicly shaming them. In reality, modern democratic legislation focuses on countering malign foreign influence while avoiding the label “foreign agent” altogether, and certainly does not impose social or political ostracism on civil society actors.

Based on the evidence, the BCS draft appears to be modeled far more closely on the legislation adopted by the Russian Federation prior to the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine. That legislation introduced the mandatory public labeling of “foreign agents,” with the explicit purpose of isolating and intimidating them. The BCS project also suffers from serious technical flaws: drafting errors, references to non-existent articles, the use of undefined terms in Moldovan law (such as “lobby”), the creation of a new oversight body without outlining appointment procedures or financing, and the disregard of recommendations from the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe, and ECtHR jurisprudence. Additionally, the vague definitions in the draft could arbitrarily classify elderly Moldovans receiving remittances from relatives abroad as “foreign agents.”

Despite these shortcomings, a transparent public debate on the draft law was necessary to fully assess the potential impact of such legislation and to clarify the true nature of foreign influence in Moldova. This debate was organized by ADEPT, providing a space to differentiate between beneficial and harmful external influences. In a country where all 11 parliamentary legislatures since independence have supported European integration — and where this objective is now enshrined in the Constitution — the discussion became essential for understanding how EU influence is framed within the narrative of “foreign influence.” It also highlighted that assessing foreign influence solely through the lens of external funding is reductive; ideological criteria or institutional affiliations — such as political parties promoting international ideologies or religious institutions under the jurisdiction of foreign entities — would, in the same logic, merit equal scrutiny.

This product was developed by the Association ADEPT with the support of the project “Strengthening Democratic Resilience in Moldova,” implemented by UNDP Moldova and funded by Norway, Canada, Sweden, and Denmark. The content of this material belongs to the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations, including UNDP, its member states, or the donors.